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LABOR LAw-LABon-MANAGEMENT R:sLA'IlONS Acrr-Av.AJLABILITY OF IN-
JUNCTIVE Rm.mp UNDBR SECTION 301-Plaintiff union brought suit in a federal 
district court under section 301 of the LMRA1 to enjoin defendant employer 
from violating a collective bargaining agreement by refusing to give effect to 
an arbitration award directing the reinstatement of certain employees. On 
appeal from an order of the district court dismissing the complaint on the 
ground that the Norris-LaGuardia Act2 prevented the court from issuing an 
injunction, held,. reversed. Section 301(a) of the LMRA authorizes federal 
courts to enjoin violations of collective agreements, and the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act does not forbid the granting of such relief. Milk and Ice Cream Drivers 
and Dairy Employees Union, Local No. 98 17. Gillespie Milk Products Corp., 
(6th Cir. 1953) 203 F.(2d) 650. 
Section 301 of the LMRA represents an attempt by Congress to make col-
lective bargaining agreements equally binding on employers and unions by 
providing a more effective means for their enforcement than was available 
under the laws of many states.!1 To this end the federal courts were opened 
to "suits for violation of" labor contracts in industries affecting commerce with-
out regard to the normal jurisdictional prerequisites of diversity of citizenship 
and amount in controversy.4 An examination of the cases considering the 
lLabor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 156, §30I(a) (1947), as 
amended, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §185(a). Sec. 30l(a) provides: "Suits for viola-
tion of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees :in 
an :industry affecting commerce • • . may be brought :in any district court of the United 
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or 
without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 
2 47 Stat. L. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1946) §101-115. 
3 See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 15 et seq. (1947). 
4 For a discussion of the constitutional basis for section 301 and the problem of 
whether federal or state law is to be applied thereunder see Wallace, ''The Contract Cause 
of Action Under the Taft-Hartley Act," 16 BnooKL'ffi L. R:sv. I (1949). 
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problem of whether section 30l(a) authorizes injunctive relief as well as a 
damage remedy discloses that approximately two-thirds of the courts faced with 
this question have indicated that they lacked authority to issue injunctions,5 
while the remaining one-third have been willing to grant equitable relief.6 
However, it appears that the conllicting results stem not so much from any 
disagreement over the proper interpretation to be accorded section 30l(a) as 
from the perennial problem of what constitutes a "labor dispute" within the 
meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Almost without exception those courts 
which have refused injunctive relief have based their decisions on the ap-
plicability of the Norris Act;7 and, at least prior to the principal case, the courts 
which have granted injunctions have done so only after finding that no ''labor 
dispute" was involved,8 or upon determining that the procedural requirements 
and other limitations9 of the Norris Act had been met.10 Thus there seems to 
be little dissent from two basic propositions: (I) section 301 of the LMRA did 
not accomplish an implied repeal pro tanto of the Norris Act; (2) when the 
Norris Act is inapplicable or its procedural and other requirements are satisfied, 
injunctive r~lief is authorized by section 301.11 These propositions appear to 
represent a reasonable construction of section 30l(a), and both find support 
in its legislative history. That Congress did not intend by section 30l(a) to 
remove any of the Norris Act's restrictions upon the equitable powers of federal 
courts seems to follow as a matter of construction from the fact that the Norris 
Act was specifically made inapplicable to suits under several other sections of 
the LMRA.12 The same conclusion is indicated by the legislative history of 
section 301, for a provision in the House bill13 explicitly exempting suits for 
breach of contract from the operation of the Norris Act was rejected by the 
5 See cases cited in note 7 infra. 
6 See cases cited in notes 8 and 10 infra. 
7 Alcoa Steamship Co. v. McMahon, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 81 F. Supp. 541, affd. (2d 
Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 567, cert. den. 338 U.S. 821, 70 S.Ct. 65 (1949); Castle & 
Cooke Terminals v. Local 137, International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 
(D.C. Hawaii 1953) ll0 F. Supp. 247; Textile Workers Union of America v. Berryton 
Mills, (D.C. Ga. 1951) 20 CCH Lab. Cas. 1[66,519; Local 937 of International Union 
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Royal 
Typewriter Co., (D.C. Conn. 1949) 88 F. Supp. 669; Duris v. Phelps Dodge Copper 
Products Corp., (D.C. N.J. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 229. An exception is United Packing 
House Workers of America v. Wilson and Co., (D.C. ill. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 563, where 
the decision seems to be based both on the applicability of the Norris Act and on the lack 
of equitable jurisdiction under §301. The fact that the activity sought to be enjoined 
constitutes an unfair labor practice as well as a breach of contract may result in a denial 
of injunctive relief. See Levinson, ''Breach of Contract Under the Taft-Hartley Act," 2 
LAB. L.J. 279 (1951). 
s Textile Workers Union of America v. American Thread Co., (D.C. Mass. 1953) 
ll3 F. Supp. 137; Mountain States Division No. 17, Communication Workers of America 
v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., (D.C. Colo. 1948) 81 F. Supp. 397. 
9 I.e., those contained in 47 Stat. L. 70-71, §4 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1946) §104. 
10 Textile Workers Union of America v. Aleo Manufacturing Co., (D.C. N.C. 1950) 
94 F. Supp. 626. 
11 For a contrary view as to the latter statement see TELLER, Tm, LAW GOVERNING 
LABOR DISPUTES AND CoLLECTIVll BARGAINING §398.163 (1950 Supp.). 
12 See §§IO(h), 208(b), and 302(e). 
18 H.R. 3020, §302(e), 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947). 
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Senate-House conference committee.14 This congressional recognition that a 
Norris Act problem existed in connection with section 30l(a), coupled with 
the lack of any attempt specifically to restrict the operation of that section to 
suits for damages, would also seem to indicate an understanding that, subject 
to Norris Act limitations, equity jurisdiction was being conferred on the federal 
courts. Consequently, to most courts presented with an application for in-
junctive relief for breach of contract the crucial inquiry has been, does such a 
suit grow out of a "labor dispute," as defined in section 13 of the Norris Act?15 
To this question there is no obviously correct answer. According to the letter 
of section 13 there is no doubt that a labor dispute is involved, but considerations 
of congressional intent , and public policy perhaps militate against a literal 
application of this extremely broad definition to breach of contract cases.16 
Although the rationale of the decision in the instant case is far from clear, there 
is almost nothing in the opinion to indicate that the court intended to embrace 
the theory of repeal by implication.17 Yet, on the other hand, there was no 
clear statement of whether or not the court felt that a labor dispute was involved, 
and if not, why not.18 In fact, the court seemingly relied heavily on one of its 
previous decisions19 which it was admitted did not even mention the Norris Act. 
Thus the instant case is significant, not for an especially clear or persuasive 
exposition of the view that injunctive relief is available under section 301 despite 
the Norris Act, but simply because it represents the decision of the highest 
federal court to have thus far indicated that such relief may properly be granted. 
George B. Berridge, S.Ed. 
14 Unfortunately, however, the conference committee report does not state speci£cally 
why this provision was removed. See H. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 66 (1947). 
15 Sec. 13(a): "A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when 
the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; 
or have direct or indirect interests therein ••.. " See also §§13(b), 13(c). 
16 For a discussion of the problem see 37 VA. L. REv. 739 (1951). 
17 The rather ambiguous statement, "We think the unqualified use of the word 'suits' 
in the Labor Management Relations Act authorizes injunctive process for the full enforce-
ment of the substantive rights created by Section 301(a) ... ," is about as close as the 
court comes to indicating approval of this theory. Principal case at 651. 
18 Thus the opinion seems to be equally susceptible of either of two interpretations: 
(1) it was taken for granted that no labor dispute was involved; (2) it was felt that 
although a labor dispute might be involved plaintiff could perhaps satisfy the procedural 
requirements of the Norris Act. 
19 A.F.L. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., (6th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 535. 
